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This paper analyzes a model of sequential parimutuel betting described as a two-
horse race with a ﬁnite number of noise bettors and a ﬁnite number of strategic and
symmetrically informed bettors. For generic objective probabilities that the favorite
wins the race, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized. Additionally,
two explanations for the favorite–longshot bias—according to which favorites win
more often than the market’s estimate of their winning chances imply—are oﬀered. It
is shown that this robust anomalous empirical regularity might be due to the presence
of transaction costs and/or to strategic bettors’ subjective attitude to probabilities.
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R´ esum´ e
Nous consid´ erons un mod` ele s´ equentiel de pari-mutuel d´ ecrit comme une course
` a deux chevaux, avec un nombre ﬁni de parieurs sym´ etriquement inform´ es. En
pr´ esence de liquidit´ e, nous montrons que l’unique ´ equilibre parfait en sous-jeux est
caract´ eris´ e par un biais en faveur de l’outsider dans le cas o` u des coˆ uts de transaction
existent et/ou lorsque les parieurs pond` erent subjectivement les probabilit´ es.1 Introduction
Empirical and theoretical research on racetrack betting has been expanded during
the last twenty years due to the importance of the industry and, more generally,
to the recent rise of gambling opportunities around the world. Horserace betting
markets also capture important elements of investment decisions under uncertainty
and they possess several usual attributes of ﬁnancial markets. For example, they
are characterized by a large number of investors (bettors) acting in a rich interac-
tive and uncertain environment. Another interesting feature of racetrack betting
markets is that prices (odds) of a particular horse are a decreasing function of the
total amount bet on that horse. This means that rational participants consider the
negative eﬀect of their bets on their expected earnings. As they take into account
the impact of their actions on odds, these participants can be assimilated to strategic
traders in the recent literature on market microstructure where the process of price
formation is explicitly modeled (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). More in-
directly, the study of racetrack betting may help to understand traders’ behaviors in
ﬁnancial markets because the increased frequency of actual gambling may have po-
tentially important eﬀects on changed attitudes toward risk taking in stock market
investments.
Contrary to stock markets, racetrack betting markets are conveniently charac-
terized by a well-deﬁned end-point at which each bet possesses a deﬁnite value.
More generally, horserace betting markets provide a paradigmatic example of a case
where the organization of the market determines the game form and the type of
competition. Hence, since the “rules of the game” driving horserace betting markets
are unambiguously deﬁned, such markets provide a useful perspective for theoretical
and empirical economic analyses.
Several empirical studies have provided evidence that most racetrack betting
markets do not satisfy weak form eﬃciency because favorites win more often than
the market’s estimate of their winning chances imply. This observation implies that
the expected return per unit of money bet on a horse increases with the probability of
the horse winning. In other words, higher average returns could be earned by betting
on favorites (generally identiﬁed by lower odds) than by betting on horses with a
lower probability to win (generally identiﬁed by higher odds). Such a phenomenon
is known in the literature as the favorite–longshot bias. Among the reasons provided
1in the literature to explain why favorites win more often than the betting odds
indicate, one can ﬁnd arguments that turn on risk-loving preferences, context speciﬁc
behaviour, overconﬁdence, extra utility from betting on longshots, bettors’ tendency
to discount a ﬁx fraction of their losses, optimal responses by bookmakers (insider
trading), etc.1
This paper proposes two theoretical explanations for the favorite–longshot bias in
a model of sequential parimutuel betting. We ﬁrst show that this robust anomalous
empirical regularity might be due to the presence of transaction costs. Such an
explanation was already proposed by Hurley and McDonough (1995, 1996). However,
by testing experimentally the implications of their theoretical modelling, the latter
authors rejected this argument. Alternatively, we show that the bias might result
from bettors’ subjective attitude to probabilities. Indeed, numerous empirical studies
have provided evidence that biases in subjective odds result from the fact that bettors
are oversensitive to the chances of winning on longshots and oversensitive to the
chances of losing on favorites.2 By building a game-theoretical framework where
non-expected utility players interact, we show that this simple argument is strongly
appealing.
Our model retains the basic features of the parimutuel system considered by
Watanabe, Nonoyama, and Mori (1994). In particular, each bettor can choose be-
tween betting on one of two horses or withdrawing from betting. However, since we
consider a common prior belief on the winning chances of each horse, noises bettors
are introduced in order to avoid the unique no-betting equilibrium obtained when all
bettors have consistent beliefs and are perfectly rational. Another distinction with
Watanabe et al.’s (1994) theoretical framework is that in our model bets are placed
sequentially rather than simultaneously. This feature, which has been introduced
by Feeney and King (2001) in a game where players cannot refrain from betting,
captures more realistically the working of racetrack betting markets where odds are
listed on a tote board which is updated about once a minute. Besides, sequential
choices allow the characterization of a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium. It is
also worth noticing that, contrary to most theoretical works analyzing parimutuel
systems, we consider a ﬁnite number of bettors, which implies that each of them
1For more details on these possible explanations, see, e.g., Williams (1999).
2See, for example, Ali (1977), Thaler and Ziemba (1988), and Jullien and Salani´ e (2000).
2cannot ignore the eﬀect of his betting choice on odds.3 Finally—so far as we know,
for the ﬁrst time—we allow players to subjectively weight winning chances of both
horses.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the sequential betting
model. In Section 3 we introduce bettors’ subjective attitudes to probability, we
characterize the equilibrium of the market accordingly, and we discuss the eﬀects of
transaction costs and probability distortions on equilibrium subjective probabilities.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
2 A Model of Sequential Betting
We consider a horse race between two horses called F (the favorite) and L (the
longshot), with respective objective probabilities of winning the race p and 1 ¡ p,
where p > 1=2.
We consider two classes of bettors. First, there is a ﬁnite set of strategic bet-
tors (or simply bettors), N = f1;:::;ng, who place their bets sequentially, at a
predeﬁned date. A strategic bettor maximizes his decision-weighted gain, i.e., he
maximizes a modiﬁed mathematical expectation of his gain where objective prob-
abilities are replaced by subjective weights. Second, there is a ﬁnite set of noise
bettors, f1;2;:::;2Kg, who act for exogenous motives and without regard for ex-
pected gains.4 For convenience, we assume that noise bettors split their bets up
equally amongst the two horses, i.e., K noise bettors bet one unit of money on horse
F and K noise bettors bet one unit of money on horse L.
Each (strategic) bettor has the option to bet one unit of money on the favorite
or to bet one unit of money on the longshot or to refrain from betting. More
precisely, each bettor i 2 N = f1;:::;ng chooses an action si 2 Si = fF;L;Dg
in period i, where F stands for “betting one unit of money on the favorite”, L for
“betting one unit of money on the longshot”, and D for “withdrawing”. Denote by
sk = fs1;:::;skg the vector of actions chosen by the ﬁrst k bettors (i.e., the history
of length k), and write s0 = ; and sn = s. Let Sk =
Qk
i=1 Si be the set of histories
of length k, and write S0 = f;g and Sn = S. When a bettor i 2 N acts, he observes
3Simultaneous parimutuel betting with a continuum of bettors has been analyzed by Watanabe
(1997).
4As shown latter, without the presence of noise bettors the market breaks down. The noise
trader approach is discussed and justiﬁed in Shleifer and Summers (1990).
3a history si¡1 2 Si¡1 of bets made by bettors 1;:::;i ¡ 1.
For any history sk 2 Sk of length k 2 N, we partition f1;:::;kg into three sets
as
F(sk) = fi 2 f1;:::;kg : si = Fg;
L(sk) = fi 2 f1;:::;kg : si = Lg;
D(sk) = fi 2 f1;:::;kg : si = Dg:
Let F(;) = L(;) = D(;) = ;. Hence, in period k, F(sk) (respectively L(sk))
is the set of bettors who have bet on horse F (respectively horse L), and D(sk)
is the set of bettors who did not bet. For any history sk, let nF(sk) = jF(sk)j
(respectively nL(sk) = jL(sk)j) denote the number of bettors who have bet on horse
F (respectively horse L), and let nD(sk) = jD(sk)j denote the number of bettors
who have withdrawn. Of course, nF(sk) + nL(sk) + nD(sk) = k for all sk 2 Sk,
k 2 N.
In the parimutuel wagering system used at most racetracks throughout the world,
bettors bet against one another and, according to the principle of mutualization, the
winners share the stake money, after deductions have been made for the market
maker. We denote by t 2 [0;1[ this level of transaction costs, i.e., the amount that
the racetrack subtracts from each unit of money bet for expenses, taxes, and proﬁt.
Hence, given the sequence of bets of strategic bettors, s 2 S, and the number of
noise bettors, 2K, the gross return to a winning one unit of money bet on horse
h 2 fF;Lg is given by
Rh(s) = (1 ¡ t)
nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
nh(s) + K
:
Let Oh(s) = Rh(s) ¡ 1 denote the ﬁnal odds against horse h 2 fF;Lg, which
measure the net return per unit of money wagered.5 Subjective probabilities refer
to the betting market’s estimate of each horse’s chance of winning the race.6 We
5Since the sum of prices implied in the odds,
P
h 1=(Oh + 1), is greater than one, the average
bettor trades at a loss, which implies that the track secures a proﬁt overall. For this reason, without
the presence of noise bettors, the market necessarily breaks down since everybody would drop from
betting.
6This term has its root in the constant returns model, where it is assumed that the transaction




nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
;
the subjective probability of horse h 2 fF;Lg. The concept of subjective probability
of a horse has been widely used in the racetrack betting literature. In particular,
when the favorite–longshot bias is observed, the subjective probability of the favorite
is lower than its objective probability, and the subjective probability of the longshot
is higher than its objective probability.
3 Characterizations of Equilibria
In this section we deﬁne bettors’ strategies and their decision-weighted utilities.
Then, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized according to objective
probabilities, the number of noise bettors, the level of transaction costs, and strategic
bettors’ tendency to subjectively weight objective probabilities.
Bettors i’s behavioral strategy, for i 2 N, is denoted ¾i : Si¡1 ! Si, and a proﬁle
of behavioral strategies is denoted by ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾n). Let s(¾ j sk) be the ﬁnal
history (outcome) reached according to the proﬁle of behavioral strategies ¾, given
the history sk 2 Sk, and let s(¾ j ;) = s(¾) be the ﬁnal history generated according
to ¾.7
We assume that (strategic) bettors convert objective probabilities into subjective
decision weights. The decision weight attached to each state, either horse F or horse
L wins the race, is determined by a probability weighting function ¼ : [0;1] ! [0;1]
which transforms the individual probabilities of each consequence into weights. We
further assume the following (inverted) S-shaped decision-weighting function:
¼(p) =
p°
p° + (1 ¡ p)
°; (1)
where ° 2 ]0;1].8 We are drawn to this partly because empirical research on in-
dividual decision making over a period of ﬁfty years, from Preston and Baratta
(1948) to Gonzalez and Wu (1999), lends support to such an inverse-S-shaped form
and maximize wealth. See Sauer (1998) for more details.
7Note that it is equivalent for each bettor to observe either all the decisions taken by previous
bettors in the sequence or only the odds at each previous date.
8This form has been suggested by Quiggin (1982).
5in non-expected utility models,9 and partly because of convenience. Such a weight-
ing function exhibits greater sensitivity to high and low probabilities relative to
mid-range probabilities, and is concave below one-half and convex above it. This
distortion is increasing with the diﬀerence 1¡° and implies that bettors overweight
small probabilities and underweight high ones.
Accordingly, given the sequence of bets s 2 S, bettor i’s decision-weighted utility
(or simply utility) is given by
Vi(s) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¼(p)OF(s) ¡ ¼(1 ¡ p); if si = F
¼(1 ¡ p)OL(s) ¡ ¼(p); if si = L




> > > > <
> > > > :
¼(p)(1 + OF(s)) ¡ 1; if si = F
¼(1 ¡ p)(1 + OL(s)) ¡ 1; if si = L
0; if si = D.
With the aforementioned class of probability weighting functions, bettor i’s
decision-weighted utility is given by
Vi(s) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(1 ¡ t)p°
p° + (1 ¡ p)
°
nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
nF(s) + K
¡ 1; if si = F
(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ p)
°
p° + (1 ¡ p)
°
nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
nL(s) + K
¡ 1; if si = L
0; if si = D.
Note that because (strategic) bettors face only two possible states, they behave
accordingly to rank-dependent expected utility maximizers.10 Hence, the bettors’
behavior doesn’t lead to violations of stochastic dominance. Of course, when ° = 1,
bettors are simply expected utility maximizers.
A subgame perfect equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) is a proﬁle of behavioral
strategies ¾ such that for all i 2 N, si 2 Si, and si¡1 2 Si¡1 we have
9See Starmer (2000) for a survey of non-expected utility theories under risk.
10Axiomatizations of rank-dependent expected utility have been presented, among others, by














To simplify the exposition, we assume as a tie-breaking rule that a bettor who
expects zero utility from betting chooses to withdraw. This assumption is made
without loss of generality as long as generic objective probabilities are considered.
The next lemma shows that strategic bettors never bet on both horses. This
implies that the clustering of behavior obtained in the sequential parimutuel game
of Feeney and King (2001), where a ﬁrst group of bettors bet on one horse and
subsequent bettors bet on the other horse, breaks down whenever bettors are allowed
to refrain from betting. This result also contrasts with Watanabe et al. (1994)
where both types of betting choices are possible at equilibrium because bettors hold
mutually inconsistent beliefs.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium outcomes in which some strategic bettors bet on
the favorite and some strategic bettors bet on the longshot.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that s, where si = F and sj = L for
some i, j 2 N, is an equilibrium outcome. This implies that
Vi(s) > 0; for all i 2 F(s) [ L(s).
Since ¼(1 ¡ p) = 1 ¡ ¼(p), we get
(1 ¡ t)¼(p)
nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
nF(s) + K
¡ 1 > 0;
(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ ¼(p))
nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K
nL(s) + K




(nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K)(1 ¡ t)
;
¼(p) <
nF(s) + K ¡ t(nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K)
(nF(s) + nL(s) + 2K)(1 ¡ t)
;
which is impossible for all admissible parameters. ¤
7The next lemma shows that strategic bettors never bet on the longshot if none
of them bet on the favorite.
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium outcomes in which some strategic bettors bet on
the longshot and no strategic bettors bet on the favorite.
Proof. Let nF(s) = 0. A player who bets on the longshot has strictly positive
utility if and only if
¼(p) <
K ¡ t(nL(s) + 2K)
(nL(s) + 2K)(1 ¡ t)
;
which is impossible since
K¡t(nL(s)+2K)
(nL(s)+2K)(1¡t) · 1=2 and ¼(p) > 1=2. ¤
From the two previous lemmas we know that strategic bettors never bet on the
longshot. Hence, we get the following result.
Lemma 3 There is no equilibrium outcomes in which some strategic bettors bet on
the longshot.
Proof. Directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. ¤
Thus, the equilibrium outcome is necessarily characterized by bets on the favorite
or by withdrawals. Of course, strategic bets on the favorite are only observed if the
number of noise bettors is suﬃciently large relatively to the level of transaction
costs. The next proposition gives a necessarily condition for the existence of an
equilibrium characterized by bets on the favorite. In particular, it is shown that if
there is no noise bettors, then the only equilibrium is for all strategic bettors to drop
from betting.
Proposition 1 If s is an equilibrium outcome and at least one strategic bettor
chooses to bet on the favorite (i.e., nF(s) ¸ 1), then t · K
2K+1.
Proof. First note that if s is an equilibrium outcome, then nL(s) = 0 from
Lemma 3. Assume by way of contradiction that t > K
2K+1 and nF(s) ¸ 1. The ﬁrst
inequality gives
8K + 1




(2K + 1)(1 ¡ t)
; since ¼(p) · 1
=) ¼(p) <
K + nF(s)
(2K + nF(s) + nL(s))(1 ¡ t)
; since nF(s) ¸ 1 and nL(s) = 0
=) Vi(s) < 0; for all i 2 F(s).
Hence, each bettor i 2 F(s) deviates by withdrawing, a contradiction with the fact
that s is an equilibrium outcome. ¤
The next theorem gives a complete characterization of the equilibrium outcome.
The equilibrium pattern of behavior is relatively simple. When the objective prob-
ability of the favorite reaches high probability intervals, then the number of bets
on the favorite increases. Since bettors who bet on the favorite obtain a strictly
positive utility and others get zero utility, it is intuitively clear that the equilibrium
exhibits a ﬁrst mover advantage, the ﬁrst bettors in the sequence choosing to bet
on the favorite until its odd is too low to expect positive utility. The proof of this
result needs some additional lemmas; the complete arguments and calculations are
given in the appendix.
Theorem 1 Let ¾ be a subgame perfect equilibrium and let k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g.
1. If p <
(K+1)1=°
(K¡t(2K+1))1=°+(K+1)1=°, then s(¾) = (D;:::;D).




(K¡t(2K+k+1))1=°+(K+k+1)1=°[, then s(¾) =
(F;:::;F;D;:::;D), where nF(sk) = k.
3. If p >
(K+n)1=°
(K¡t(2K+n))1=°+(K+n)1=°, then s(¾) = (F;:::;F).
Proof. See the appendix. ¤
A ﬁrst obvious consequence of Theorem 1 is that the subjective probability of
a horse is increasing with its objective probability. We also remark that if there
is no transaction costs (t = 0) and if strategic bettors maximize their expected
gains (° = 1), then the equilibrium subjective probability of each horse is close
to its objective probability. Indeed, in that case, if p 2 ] K+k
2K+k; K+k+1
2K+k+1[, then the
9subjective probability of the favorite is PF(s) = K+k
2K+k. The same argument applies
for objective and subjective probabilities of the longshot. The following examples
illustrate this result with two and three strategic bettors and with K = 2 and K = 4.
Example 1 Let n = K = 2, ° = 1, and t = 0. Depending on the value of the
favorite’s objective probability, p, the equilibrium outcomes and subjective proba-
bilities of the favorite are given by Figure 1 on page 18.
Example 2 Let n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1, and t = 0. Depending on the value
of the favorite’s objective probability, p, the equilibrium outcomes and subjective
probabilities of the favorite are given by Figure 2 on page 18.
Assume now that transaction costs are strictly positive, i.e., t > 0, and assume
again that strategic bettors maximize their expected gains, i.e., ° = 1. From The-
orem 1, if p 2 ] K+k
(2K+k)(1¡t); K+k+1
(2K+k+1)(1¡t)[, then the subjective probability of the
favorite is PF(s) = K+k
2K+k, which becomes smaller than p as t increases. Therefore,
in this model, when transaction costs increase, the favorite–longshot bias appears at
equilibrium. The next example illustrates this point with the same parameters as
Example 2, but with t = 1=4, which is approximately the level of transaction costs
of racetrack betting markets in France.
Example 3 Let n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1, and t = 1=4. Depending on the value
of the favorite’s objective probability, p, the equilibrium outcomes and subjective
probabilities of the favorite are given by Figure 3 on page 18. A comparison of
Figures 2 and 3 shows the tendency of strategic bettors to refrain from betting
when there are signiﬁcant transaction costs, resulting in a decrease of the favorite’s
subjective probability.
Finally, consider that there is no transaction costs but that strategic bettors
subjectively weight the prior objective probabilities according to the (inverted) S-





K1=°+(K+k+1)1=°[, then the subjective probability of the favorite
is PF(s) = K+k
2K+k, which becomes smaller than p as ° decreases. Hence, the more
the bettors “distort” true winning chances of both horses the larger the favorite–
longshot bias. The next example illustrates this bias with the same parameters as
Example 2, but with ° = 1=2.
10Example 4 Let n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1=2, and t = 0. Depending on the value
of the favorite’s objective probability, p, the equilibrium outcomes and subjective
probabilities of the favorite are given by Figure 4 on page 18. A comparison of
Figures 2 and 4 shows that probability distortions generate the favorite–longshot
bias because strategic bettors tend to refrain from betting even with relatively high
objective probabilities of the favorite.
More generally, the eﬀects of transaction costs or (and) probability distortions
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The diﬀerence between the objective probability and the subjective
probability of the favorite (longshot) is increasing (decreasing) with transaction costs,
t, and bettors’ probability distortions, 1 ¡ °.
Proof. Directly from Theorem 1 ¤
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed a simple model of sequential parimutuel betting
in which non-expected utility players either bet on one of two horses or withdraw.
To avoid the no-betting equilibrium, noise bettors have been introduced. We have
shown that the favorite–longshot bias (according to which favorites are underbet
and longshots overbet) may be observed at the (unique) equilibrium due to the
presence of transaction costs and/or to bettors’ tendency to subjectively weight
horses’ winning chances. While there is some empirical evidence suggesting that the
favorite–longshot bias is not explained by transaction costs, the probability distortion
argument still remains appealing. Indeed, such an explanation is consistent with
numerous empirical studies on racetrack betting markets and, more generally, with
the recently growing theoretical and experimental literature on non-expected utility
under risk.
Though this paper has formalized an empirically supported explanation for the
favorite–longshot bias by incorporating non-expected utility bettors in a game the-
oretical framework, it should be interesting to consider a racetrack betting market
with more than two horses. Such an extension would permit to examine how the al-
location of strategic bets and the magnitude of the favorite–longshot bias depend on
11the distribution of objective probabilities. More particularly, the empirical evidence
that only extreme favorites have positive expected values need to be theoretically
conﬁrmed. As in this suggested theoretical framework bettors would face more than
two possible states, one should consider rank-dependent functional forms. By doing
so, there is room for ﬁnding probability weighting functions which account for these
additional empirical facts. However, this remains the topic of future research.
Appendix. Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix we provide several additional lemmas and we prove Theorem 1.
Since the sequential betting game considered in this paper can be reduced to an
extensive form game with perfect information, we know that there exists a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see, for example, Myerson, 1991, Theo-
rem 4.7, p. 186). Hence, to show Theorem 1, it is suﬃcient to show that any outcome
inconsistent with Theorem 1 is not an equilibrium outcome. We ﬁrst prove the ﬁrst
and the third parts of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1(1). First note that p <
(K+1)1=°
(K¡t(2K+1))1=°+(K+1)1=° is equivalent
to ¼(p) < K+1
(2K+1)(1¡t). Assume by way of contradiction that this last inequality is
satisﬁed and that s is an equilibrium outcome satisfying nF(s) ¸ 1. From Lemma 3




(1 ¡ t)(nF(s) + 2K)
=) ¼(p) >
K + 1
(1 ¡ t)(2K + 1)
;
a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1(3). Assume that p >
(K+n)1=°
(K¡t(2K+n))1=°+(K+n)1=°, i.e., ¼(p) >
K+n
(2K+n)(1¡t), and that nD(s) ¸ 1, where s = s(¾), and ¾ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Consider a bettor who does not bet, i 2 D(s). His equilibrium utility
is equal to zero. If he deviates and chooses to bet on the favorite, then his utility
becomes, with si¡1 = (F;:::;F):
12Vi(si¡1;s(¾ j si¡1;F))
= (1 ¡ t)¼(p)
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + nL(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + 2K
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + K
¡ 1
¸ (1 ¡ t)¼(p)
2K + n
K + n
¡ 1 > 0:
Hence, ¾ is not an equilibrium because each bettor i 2 D(s) deviates and bets on
the favorite. ¤
Now, we provide several lemmas used to prove the second part of the theorem.
The next lemma extends Lemma 1 to any subgame of the sequential betting game.
Lemma 4 For any subgame (along or outside the equilibrium path), there is no
equilibrium outcomes of this subgame in which some strategic bettors bet on the
favorite and some strategic bettors bet on the longshot.
Proof. The proof is similar to the Proof of Lemma 1. ¤





(K ¡ t(2K + k))
1=° + (K + k)
1=°;
(K + k + 1)
1=°
(K ¡ t(2K + k + 1))
1=° + (K + k + 1)
1=°[;
nL(sj¡1) = 0, and nF(sj¡1) · k, then nF(s(¾ j sj¡1)) · k.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that ¼(p) < K+k+1
(1¡t)(2K+k+1), ¾ is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium, nL(sj¡1) = 0, nF(sj¡1) · k, and nF(s(¾ j sj¡1)) > k.
Let s = s(¾ j sj¡1). For all i 2 F(s), i ¸ j, we have
13Vi(s) = (1 ¡ t)¼(p)




K + k + 1
2K + k + 1




K + k + 1
2K + k + 1
nF(s) + 2K
nF(s) + K
¡ 1; because nL(s) = 0 by Lemma 4
·
K + k + 1
2K + k + 1
2K + k + 1
K + k + 1
; because nF(s) ¸ k + 1
= 0:
Hence, each player i 2 F(s), i ¸ j, deviates by choosing to drop from betting, which
implies that s is not an equilibrium outcome. ¤




(K ¡ t(2K + k))
1=° + (K + k)
1=°;
(K + k + 1)
1=°
(K ¡ t(2K + k + 1))
1=° + (K + k + 1)
1=°[;
and s is an equilibrium outcome, then nF(s) ¸ k.
Proof. Consider a subgame perfect equilibrium ¾, and let s = s(¾) be the associ-
ated equilibrium outcome. Assume by way of contradiction that ¼(p) > K+k
(1¡t)(2K+k)
and that nF(s) < k. Each bettor i 2 D(s) has zero utility. If he deviates and bet
on the favorite, his utility becomes
Vi(si¡1;s(¾ j si¡1;F))
= (1 ¡ t)¼(p)
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + nL(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + 2K
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + K
¡ 1
¸ (1 ¡ t)¼(p)
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + 2K
nF(s(¾ j si¡1;F)) + K
¡ 1
¸ (1 ¡ t)¼(p)
2K + k
K + k






¡ 1 = 0:
Hence, ¾ is not an equilibrium because each bettor i 2 D(s) deviates and bets on
14the favorite. ¤
From Lemma 5 and 6 we know that the number of bets on the favorite is in
accordance with Theorem 1(2). It remains to show that bets on the favorite are
always done by the ﬁrst bettors.




(K ¡ t(2K + k))
1=° + (K + k)
1=°;
(K + k + 1)
1=°
(K ¡ t(2K + k + 1))
1=° + (K + k + 1)
1=°[;
si = D and sj = F, where j > i, then s is not an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. From Lemma 5 and 6 we have nF(s) = k. Consider a bettor i 2 D(s)
such that sj = F for some j > i. This implies that nF(si¡1) < k, and thus
nF(s(¾ j si¡1);F) · k from Lemma 5. In that case it can be shown as in the Proof
of Lemma 6 that bettor i deviates by betting on the favorite. This completes the
proof of the lemma and of Theorem 1. ¤
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Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes and subjective probabilities of the favorite when
n = K = 2, ° = 1, and t = 0.
-
1/2 1 5/9 3/5 7/11











Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes and subjective probabilities of the favorite when
n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1, and t = 0.
-
1/2 1 20/27 24/30 28/33










Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes and subjective probabilities of the favorite when
n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1, and t = 0:25.
-
1/2 1 25/41 9/13 49/65










Figure 4: Equilibrium outcomes and subjective probabilities of the favorite when
n = 3, K = 4, ° = 1=2, and t = 0.
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